Evolutionary game dynamics in diploid populations
Selection that influences behaviour can be studied using game theory if individual behavioural success depends on the frequencies of various behavioural types in the population. The evolutionarily stable strategy of \textit{J. Maynard Smith} and \textit{G. R. Price} [Nature 246, 15-18 (1973)] is an equilibrium concept like the solution of a game. The dynamic model of \textit{P. D. Taylor} and \textit{L. B. Jonker} [Math. Biosciences 40, 145-156 (1978; Zbl 0395.90118)] studied in detail by \textit{E. C. Zeeman} [see J. Theor. Biol. 89, 249-270 (1981)] goes beyond game theory using fitness to cause evolution, perhaps towards an equilibrium. A diploid version of their haploid model is considered and it is found that diploid evolution can be quite different. For example catastrophic bifurcations can occur between stable internal polymorphisms when the game matrix entries are changed slowly. A slight drop in food supply may cause extinction. Totally unfit altruistic genotypes can be maintained if they help the rest of the population. The relation of haploid game models to constant selection in diploids is also discussed.
- Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player I. Two-species haploid or randomly mating diploid
- Polymorphic evolutionary games
- On the local stability of an evolutionarily stable strategy in a diploid population
- Evolutionarily stable strategies of diploid populations with semi-dominant inheritance patterns
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702466 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3475274 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3486756 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3500750 (Why is no real title available?)
- RULES FOR TESTING STABILITY OF A SELECTIVE POLYMORPHISM
- The logic of animal conflict
- Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model
- Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles
- The ``battle of the sexes: A genetic model with limit cycle behavior
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
- Evolutionary game dynamics with impulsive effects
- Polymorphic evolutionary games and non-Mendelian genetics
- Asymmetric games in monomorphic and polymorphic populations
- A genetic approach to the rock-paper-scissors game
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
- Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
- From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive
- Evolutionarily stable strategies of diploid populations with semi-dominant inheritance patterns
- Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player I. Two-species haploid or randomly mating diploid
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 836601 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning dynamics and the co-evolution of competing sexual species
- A generalization of Pontryagin's maximum principle for dynamic evolutionary games among relatives
- Polymorphic evolutionary games
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary game dynamics in diploid populations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q761378)
