A framework for riddles about truth that do not involve self-reference (Q763326)

This paper presents a framework within which solutions to logic puzzles of the knight/knave kind (where respondents always tell the truth / always lie / answer at random) can be derived. An analogue of \(T\)-sentences is permitted, but the language is sufficiently weak (in not containing self-referential sentences) to remain consistent [\textit{A. Gupta}, ``Truth and paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 11, 1--60 (1982; Zbl 0512.03002)]. Three-question or fewer solutions are provided to the ``hardest logic puzzle ever'', a puzzle due to Smullyan via Boolos, where the respondent answers ``da'' or ``ja'' (one of which means ``Yes'', and the other ``No'') and may be a truth-teller, a liar, or answer at random.