Russell's theory of knowledge and Wittgenstein's earliest writings (Q800902)

The authoress discusses the bearing of Russell's manuscript of 1913 known as 'Theory of knowledge' (recently published as Volume 7 of the Collected papers of Bertrand Russell) and Wittgenstein's early philosophical writings. Whereas Russell wished to pass from clarity in logic to certainties about the philosophical world, Wittgenstein tended to take the opposite track. Russell had to grant logical form a certain status in his system, and one that is hard to appraise (pp. 292-296). The authoress examines this and related topics, such as the existence of (putative) logical objects and the connection between a proposition and its truth- value. The rest of the article is taken up with certain assertions in Wittgenstein's notebooks. Now that the manuscript is published, interest in it is likely to increase still further. Already in press is an important study of \textit{N. Griffin}: Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement, Philosophical studies (to appear).