The calculus of ethical voting (Q863398)

Behaviour in laboratory experiments and in the field does not always correspond to the predictions of decision and game theory. In particular a difficult problem for standard game-theoretic models is the observed large turnout in large elections. A solution for the problem of participation in large elections was proposed by \textit{Feddersen} and \textit{Sandorini} [Am. Econ. Rev. (in press)] who consider a model with ethical agents. This model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior. In the reviewed article the conceptual and operational foundations for the ethical voter model are developed. In addition we show that ethical models share a common mathematical structure with elite driven turnout models. A two-candidate election is modeled in which a large population of agents may vote for candidate 1, vote for candidate 2 or abstain. Voting costs vary within the population and a single vote is never pivotal. Each agent is in some arbitrary group. Given the behavior of agents outside the group, a rule defines how each agent should behave in the group. It is shown that in order to produce consistent behavioral profiles, an agent must take as given the behavior of those who have different candidate preferences. An important feature of consistent ethical reasoning is that agents should properly anticipate the actual behavior that rules will produce if accepted by a group. It is shown that properly anticipating incentivities to follow rules ensures that the behavior upon which rules are evaluated are the same as the behavior that actually occurs. It is shown also that if the agents' behavior is consistent then there exists a cut-off point for each type such that the agents with voting costs below this threshold should vote for their favored candidate. These results provide a solid foundation for the theory of ethical voting. Anyway the existence and uniqueness of consistent profiles. A one-to-one correspondence between the cut-off points that define a consistent profile and a pure strategy equilibrium of a suitably defined two-player game that is called two-player game is shown. A mixed strategy equilibrium in two-player game cannot be mapped into a consistent behavioral profile. It is shown that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a two-player game for an interesting class of elections and is unique. This result establishes the existence and uniqueness of consistent profiles.