Job matching: A multi-principal, multi-agent model

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The authors consider a job market model consisting of two groups of individuals, the job applicants (the informed) and the employers (the uninformed). The applicants have private information about their educational level. Each employer announces a wage schedule offering a wage level for each educational level. Each applicant chooses his educational level and accepts a job from among those offered to the applicants of his educational level. The applicants behave noncooperatively as the Stackelberg followers. The employers are the Stackelberg leaders: anticipating optimal reactions from the applicants, they play a game which is a special instance of a multi-principal, multi-agent problem. In the paper two equilibrium concepts are proposed: (1) a noncooperative equilibrium, a version of Nash equilibrium which postulates noncooperative and passive behavior of the employers, and (2) a cooperative equilibrium, a version of strong equilibrium which postulates cooperative and passive behavior of the employers. Under suitable assumptions it is proved that a cooperative equilibrium does not exist. On the other hand it is shown that a noncooperative equilibrium exists in many cases. The authors argue that it is not the informational advantage, but rather possession of the right information (in the sense that it best serves the needs of applicants) that enables an employer to win. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0931.00016].











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