Kyle-Back equilibrium models and linear conditional mean-field SDEs
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Abstract: In this paper we study the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model in which the insider has an instantaneous information on an asset, assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenback-type dynamics that allows possible influence by the market price. Such a model exhibits some further interplay between insider's information and the market price, and it is the first time being put into a rigorous mathematical framework of the recently developed {it conditional mean-field} stochastic differential equation (CMFSDEs). With the help of the "reference probability measure" concept in filtering theory, we shall first prove a general well-posedness result for a class of linear CMFSDEs, which is new in the literature of both filtering theory and mean-field SDEs, and will be the foundation for the underlying strategic equilibrium model. Assuming some further Gaussian structures of the model, we find a closed form of optimal intensity of trading strategy as well as the dynamic pricing rules. We shall also substantiate the well-posedness of the resulting optimal closed-loop system, whence the existence of Kyle-Back equilibrium. Our result recovers many existing results as special cases.
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Cited in
(16)- Insider trading with a random deadline under partial observations: maximal principle method
- Linear Bayesian equilibrium in insider trading with a random time under partial observations
- Insider trading with memory under random deadline
- Weak Kyle-Back equilibrium models for Max and ArgMax
- KYLE–BACK’S MODEL WITH A RANDOM HORIZON
- On pricing rules and optimal strategies in general Kyle-Back models
- A general conditional McKean-Vlasov stochastic differential equation
- Kyle-back models with risk aversion and non-Gaussian beliefs
- Strategic trading with information acquisition and long-memory stochastic liquidity
- On the equilibrium of insider trading under information acquisition with long memory
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