LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

DOI10.1017/S1365100599010019MaRDI QIDQ4267226zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Lehnert, Ethan Ligon, Robert M. Townsend

Publication date 22 September 1999

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100599010019

zbMATH Keywords

credit constraintsmoral hazardoptimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cited in

(5)

• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• Do firms want to borrow more? Testing credit constraints using a directed lending program
• Dynamic financial constraints: distinguishing mechanism design from exogenously incomplete regimes

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