Learning about analysts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.01.001MaRDI QIDQ1729680zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien Vigier

Publication date 28 February 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

social learningreputationscareer concernsanalysts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
• Professional advice
• Information control in reputational cheap talk
• Conformism and public news
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent

Cites work

• Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
• Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
• Herding and contrarian behavior in financial markets
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
• Informational cascades with endogenous prices: the role of risk aversion
• Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Social learning in a changing world
• The speed of information revelation in a financial market mechanism
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility

Cited in

(5)

• The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise
• Who consults investment analysts?
• Information control in reputational cheap talk
• Conformism and public news
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns

This page was built for publication: Learning about analysts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1729680)