Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4MaRDI QIDQ681843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pinyan Lu, Tao Xiao

Publication date 13 February 2018

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4

zbMATH Keywords

budget constrained agentsliquid welfaremulti-item auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(8)

• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
• Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
• Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
• Liquid price of anarchy
• Mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets

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