Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4MaRDI QIDQ681843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pinyan Lu, Tao Xiao

Publication date 13 February 2018

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4

zbMATH Keywords

multi-item auctionsbudget constrained agentsliquid welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

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Cited in

(7)

• Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
• Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Liquid price of anarchy
• Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
• The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings

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