LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_14MaRDI QIDQ2226586zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cristina Pérez-Solà, Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí, Guillermo Navarro-Arribas, J. Garcia-Alfaro

Publication date 8 February 2021

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_14

zbMATH Keywords

bitcoinblockchaindenial of servicelightning network (LN)network securityoff-chain payments channels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Cryptography (94A60)

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• Payment trees: low collateral payments for payment channel networks
• Ride the lightning: the game theory of payment channels
• How to profit from payments channels
• Collusion attack from hubs in the blockchain offline channel network
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• Maravedí: a secure and practical protocol to trade risk for instantaneous finality
• Epoch: enabling path concealing payment channel hubs with optimal path encryption
• Get me out of this payment! \texttt{Bailout}: an HTLC re-routing protocol

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