Manipulation via Withholding: A Generalization

DOI10.2307/2297836MaRDI QIDQ3351105zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gyoseob Yi

Publication date 1991

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297836

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityindividually-rational and Pareto-optimal allocation mechanismswithholding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• On Nash-implementation in the presence of withholding
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
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Cited in

(7)

• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
• The incentive ratio in exchange economies
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
• Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
• General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions

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