Multiple universes of sets and indeterminate truth values

The author deals with assertions that certain set-theoretic statements, such as the continuum hypothesis, are neither true nor false because of a lack of sharpness in our picture of sets. He raises the question: If a lack of sharpness causes indeterminate truth values, how does it do so? In particular, does a problem arise from there being too many set-theoretic universes? His answer is that ``if set theory is about objects and if the concept of the natural numbers is sharp, then there are no truth value gaps, or at least, no truth value gaps involving statements like the continuum hypothesis ``that result from there being too many universes of sets. In part, this depends on the kind of argument found in \textit{E. Zermelo}'s proof [Fundam. Math. 16, 29-47 (1930; JFM 56.0082.02)]\ of the categoricity of second-order ZFC relative to a fixed set of urelements and ordinals. The author's results vary according to the strength or weakness of some of the background assumptions about the notion of set, the iterative hierarchy, and several other concepts. As can be expected in discussions of such fundamental ideas, the author admits to employing in an uncritical way some notions whose definition and properties would seem to depend on the underlying set theory. This is all done in an open and honest way. It should be noted that the author remains open-minded about whether all statements of set theory have truth values.

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