The set-theoretic multiverse

DOI10.1017/S1755020311000359MaRDI QIDQ2919945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Joel David Hamkins

Publication date 23 October 2012

Published in The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223

zbMATH Keywords

axiom of constructibilitycontinuum hypothesisforcingmultiverse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Set theory (03E99)

Abstract: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

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