Nash welfare guarantees for fair and efficient coverage
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Abstract: We study coverage problems in which, for a set of agents and a given threshold , the goal is to select subsets (of the agents) that, while satisfying combinatorial constraints, achieve fair and efficient coverage among the agents. In this setting, the valuation of each agent is equated to the number of selected subsets that contain it, plus one. The current work utilizes the Nash social welfare function to quantify the extent of fairness and collective efficiency. We develop a polynomial-time -approximation algorithm for maximizing Nash social welfare in coverage instances. Our algorithm applies to all instances wherein, for the underlying combinatorial constraints, there exists an FPTAS for weight maximization. We complement the algorithmic result by proving that Nash social welfare maximization is APX-hard in coverage instances.
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Cites work
- A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
- Almost envy-free repeated matching in two-sided markets
- Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems.
- Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
- Exceptional Paper—Location of Bank Accounts to Optimize Float: An Analytic Study of Exact and Approximate Algorithms
- Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1839431 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nash welfare guarantees for fair and efficient coverage
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