On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11MaRDI QIDQ3645310zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ahuva Mu'alem

Publication date 17 November 2009

Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11

zbMATH Keywords

anonymous pricesmechanism designscheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(11)

• A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
• A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
• Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
• Competitive auctions and envy-freeness for group of agents
• Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
• No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
• Envy-free makespan approximation
• The price of envy-freeness in machine scheduling
• Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
• The price of envy-freeness in machine scheduling

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