On Transparency in Organizations

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU040MaRDI QIDQ4610726zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Jehiel

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu040

zbMATH Keywords

dimensionalityinformation disclosuretransparency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
• Transparency and special interests
• The dark side of transparency: when hiding in plain sight works
• The costs of increasing transparency
• Transparency, entry, and productivity
• Transparency and economic policy
• Transparency, complementarity and holdout
• Redefining the transparency order
• Transparency and the KK principle

Cited in

(14)

• Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment
• Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns
• The costs of increasing transparency
• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Peer transparency in teams: does it help or hinder incentives?
• Interactive information design
• The dark side of transparency: when hiding in plain sight works
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: an experimental investigation
• Firm-fit transparency and incentives
• Information hierarchies
• The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring
• Transparency and special interests
• Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors

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