Optimizing a partnership structure for horizontal collaboration in logistics

DOI10.1007/S11081-025-10037-6MaRDI QIDQ7268327zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mostafa Parsa, Dan I. Andersson, Patrik Jonsson, Yaser Malekian

Publication date 17 June 2026

Published in Optimization and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11081-025-10037-6

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationcooperative game theorycore stable coalitionsgain-sharinghorizontal collaboration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Mixed integer programming (90C11) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites work

• A competitive solution for cooperative truckload delivery
• A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation
• A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics
• Allocating cost of service to customers in inventory routing
• Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
• Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms
• Coalition-formation problem for sourcing contract design in supply networks
• Collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries
• Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions
• Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation
• Cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Cost allocation for less-than-truckload collaboration among perishable product retailers
• Cost allocation in collaborative forest transportation
• Incitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocation
• Operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics
• Profit maximizing coalitions with shared capacities in distribution networks
• Stable allocations for choice-based collaborative price setting
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure

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