Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation

DOI10.1007/S00291-015-0413-ZMaRDI QIDQ5964845zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mario Guajardo, Kurt Jörnsten, Mikael Rönnqvist

Publication date 1 March 2016

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-015-0413-z

zbMATH Keywords

collaborative logisticsforest transportationmodiclusnucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

Recommendations

• Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions
• Collaborative urban transportation: recent advances in theory and practice
• Collaborative transportation planning with forwarding limitations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 764423
• Collaborative planning in transportation
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks
• Incitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocation
• Mixed Autonomy in Ride-Sharing Networks
• Carpooling in social networks
• A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem

Cites work

• A collaborative planning approach for intermodal freight transportation
• A fair staff allocation rule for the capacity pooling of multiple call centers
• A framework for collaborative planning and state-of-the-art
• Allocation of cost savings in a three-level supply chain with demand information sharing: a cooperative-game approach
• Collaborative transportation planning of less-than-truckload freight
• Common mistakes in computing the nucleolus
• Computing the Nucleolus by Solving a Prolonged Simplex Algorithm
• Cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Cost allocation in collaborative forest transportation
• Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances
• Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.
• Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and profit sharing
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226100 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Reducing the number of linear programs needed for solving the nucleolus problem of n-person game theory
• Stability of information-sharing alliances in a three-level supply chain
• The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• The Nucleolus as a Solution of a Minimization Problem
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
• The proportional partitional Shapley value
• The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game
• Transshipment of inventories among retailers: myopic vs. farsighted stability
• Turbulent natural convection in a vertical parallel-plate channel with asymmetric heating
• Values for games with two-level communication structures
• Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure

Cited in

(16)

• Collaborative urban transportation: recent advances in theory and practice
• Generic negotiation mechanisms with side payments -- design, analysis and application for decentralized resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problems
• Multi-objective optimisation models for the travelling salesman problem with horizontal cooperation
• Combining facility location and routing decisions in sustainable urban freight distribution under horizontal collaboration: how can shippers be benefited?
• Analysing the effect of partner characteristics on the performance of horizontal carrier collaborations
• Profit maximizing coalitions with shared capacities in distribution networks
• Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms
• The value of cooperation in interregional transmission planning: a noncooperative equilibrium model approach
• Incitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocation
• A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation
• Constructive and blocking power in marine logistics
• Collaborative planning in transportation
• A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics
• Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions
• Optimizing a partnership structure for horizontal collaboration in logistics
• Cost allocation in collaborative forest transportation

This page was built for publication: Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5964845)