Ordinal imitative dynamics

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00797-7MaRDI QIDQ2147859zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Loginov

Publication date 20 June 2022

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04272

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsimitate the better realization rulepopulation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agents in a population game imitate the strategy of a randomly chosen opponent whenever the opponent`s realized payoff is higher than their own. Such behavior generates an ordinal mean dynamics which is polynomial in strategy utilization frequencies. We demonstrate that while the dynamics does not possess Nash stationarity or payoff monotonicity, under it pure strategies iteratively strictly dominated by pure strategies are eliminated and strict equilibria are locally stable. We investigate the relationship between the dynamics based on the IBR rule and the replicator dynamics. In trivial cases, the two dynamics are topologically equivalent. In Rock-Paper-Scissors games we conjecture that both dynamics exhibit the same types of behavior, but the partitions of the game set do not coincide. In other cases, the IBR dynamics exhibits behaviors that are impossible under the replicator dynamics.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(3)

• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Higher order game dynamics
• Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• EvoDyn-3s

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