Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining

DOI10.1155/2013/248968MaRDI QIDQ1789815zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Luis Carvalho

Publication date 10 October 2018

Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/248968

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Summary: Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely, the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extrarobustness and albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes do not change.

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Cited in

(1)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620864 (Why is no real title available?)

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