Phase-shift fault analysis of Trivium

DOI10.1556/012.2015.52.2.1308MaRDI QIDQ2820754zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Viliam Hromada, Juraj Varga

Publication date 9 September 2016

Published in Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1556/012.2015.52.2.1308

zbMATH Keywords

algebraic cryptanalysisfault analysisphase shiftstream cipherTrivium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

Review text

The authors improve previously known results on fault analysis of the stream cipher Trivium. It is shown (computational experiments on low-end PC) that the phase shift of two registers of the cipher can lead to an attack that requires only 120 bits of keystream per each generated sequence to successfully find the inner state of the cipher which can then be used to find the secret key.

Recommendations

• Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium
• Fault analysis of Trivium
• Floating Fault Analysis of Trivium
• Hard fault analysis of Trivium
• Improved multi-bit differential fault analysis of Trivium
• Mutant differential fault analysis of Trivium MDFA
• Differential fault analysis of Sosemanuk
• Differential fault analysis of streebog

Cited in

(7)

• New results on the state cycles of Trivium
• Hard fault analysis of Trivium
• Mutant differential fault analysis of Trivium MDFA
• Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium
• Differential Power Analysis of Stream Ciphers
• Floating Fault Analysis of Trivium
• Fault analysis of Trivium

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