Plug and play encryption
The author presents a novel protocol for secret key exchange that is provably secure against attacks by an adversary that is free to attack zero, one, or both parties in an adaptive fashion, at any time. This high degree of robustness enables larger, multiparty interactions (including multiparty secure computations) to substitute our protocol for secure private channels in a simple, plug-and-play fashion, without simultaneously limiting security analysis to attacks by static adversaries, i.e. adversaries whose curruption choices are fixed in advance. He presents constructions that are based on a novel and counterintuitive use of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; his methods extend to other standard cryptographic assumptions as well. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0870.00047].
- Non-committing encryption with constant ciphertext expansion from standard assumptions
- Adaptive security with quasi-optimal rate
- Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation with Erasures
- Possibility and impossibility results for selective decommitments
- Feasibility and infeasibility of adaptively secure fully homomorphic encryption
- Efficient one-sided adaptively secure computation
- Removing erasures with explainable hash proof systems
- Adaptively secure MPC with sublinear communication complexity
- New and improved constructions for partially equivocable public key encryption
- Adaptive zero-knowledge proofs and adaptively secure oblivious transfer
- Non-committing identity based encryption: constructions and applications
This page was built for publication: Plug and play encryption
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4364543)
