Prize-allocation rules in generalized team contests

DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01559-8MaRDI QIDQ7013836zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Katsuya Kobayashi, Hideo Konishi, Kaoru Ueda

Publication date 12 March 2025

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-024-01559-8

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous prizegroup cost minimizationheterogeneity and complementarity of membersprize allocation ruleteam contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

• A simple model of competition between teams
• Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1571459 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• The theory of externalities and public goods. Essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes
• Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Cited in

(1)

• Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy

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