Protecting AES Software Implementations on 32-Bit Processors Against Power Analysis

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-72738-5_10MaRDI QIDQ3612378zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Tillich, Christoph Herbst, Stefan Mangard

Publication date 10 March 2009

Published in Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72738-5_10

zbMATH Keywords

advanced encryption standardDPAimplementation securityinstruction set extensionspower analysisside-channel attackssoftware countermeasures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759268
• Principles on the security of AES against first and second-order differential power analysis
• Higher-order masking in practice: a vector implementation of masked AES for ARM NEON
• Buying AES design resistance with speed and energy
• Applied Cryptography and Network Security

Cited in

(5)

• Detecting side channel vulnerabilities in improved rotating S-box masking scheme -- presenting four non-profiled attacks
• Dummy shuffling against algebraic attacks in white-box implementations
• Improved see-in-the-middle attacks on AES
• Secure wire shuffling in the probing model
• Memory encryption: a survey of existing techniques

This page was built for publication: Protecting AES Software Implementations on 32-Bit Processors Against Power Analysis

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3612378)