The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer
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Publication:1102159
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90004-XzbMATH Open0643.90006OpenAlexW2161780139MaRDI QIDQ1102159FDOQ1102159
Authors: Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, James P. jun. Dow
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90004-x
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Cites Work
Cited In (7)
- On the microfoundation of linear oligopoly demand
- The Implications of Additive Community Preferences in a Multi-Consume Economy
- Inequality aversion and risk aversion
- A note on representability of consumer's behavior
- A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities
- The structure of representative preference
- Social objectives in general equilibrium
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