On repeated games with incomplete information played by non-Bayesian players

DOI10.1007/BF01781370zbMath0441.90118OpenAlexW3124659111MaRDI QIDQ1143322

Nimrod Megiddo

Publication date: 1980

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01781370

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationinfinite repetitionsnon-Bayesian players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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