A Routley-Meyer affixing style semantics for logics containing Aristotle's thesis
Aristotle's thesis is the schema \(\sim (A\to \sim A)\); Boethius' is (A\(\to B)\to \sim (A\to \sim B)\). These are important in connexive logic. Here they are added to the family of relevance logics, beginning with Routley \& Meyer's basic system \(\underset \tilde{} B\) and reaching through the Anderson \& Belnap systems, \(\underset \tilde{} E\), \(\underset \tilde{} R\), etc. These systems so extended are simply inconsistent. Nevertheless, a model theoretic semantics may be defined for them, and the systems proved to be sound and complete with respect to that semantics. This the author does using a variation on the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics for relevance logics. (The variation introduced here is less ad hoc than others previously proposed for these extended logics.)
- Aristotle's thesis in consistent and inconsistent logics
- Aristotle's Thesis between paraconsistency and modalization
- Connexive modal logic
- On the role of Aristotle's connexive axioms in non-connexive logics
- A Routley-Meyer type semantics for relevant logics including \(\text B_{\text r}\) plus the disjunctive syllogism
- Aristotle's thesis in consistent and inconsistent logics
- Aristotle's Thesis between paraconsistency and modalization
- Did Aristotle endorse Aristotle's thesis? A case study in Aristotle's metalogic
- The Aristotelicity of Thomason's semantics
- Connexive logics. An overview and current trends
- The non-relevant De Morgan minimal logic in Routley-Meyer semantics with no designated points
- Consistent theories in inconsistent logics
- A note on contradictions in Francez-Weiss logics
- Fusion, fission, and Ackermann's truth constant in relevant logics: a proof-theoretic investigation
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