Two notions of epistemic validity. Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionals
DOI10.1007/BF00413768zbMATH Open0934.03023OpenAlexW2886801669MaRDI QIDQ1292997FDOQ1292997
Publication date: 25 April 2000
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413768
Recommendations
belief revisionRamsey testAGM theoryacceptability of conditionalsepistemic validitynegative validitypositive validityRamsey's conditionals
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Cites Work
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- Conditionals and monotonic belief revisions: The success postulate
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Cited In (11)
- FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTEXT AND CONTENT: INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY
- Two Diamonds Are More Than One
- From epistemic norms to logical rules: epistemic models for logical expressivists
- Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic
- Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systems
- AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change
- AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS
- New surprises for the Ramsey test
- Indicative conditionals and graded information
- An internal version of epistemic logic
- BELIEF-REVISION, THE RAMSEY TEST, MONOTONICITY, AND THE SO-CALLED IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
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