Two notions of epistemic validity. Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionals
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Publication:1292997
DOI10.1007/BF00413768zbMath0934.03023OpenAlexW2886801669MaRDI QIDQ1292997
Publication date: 25 April 2000
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413768
belief revisionRamsey testAGM theoryacceptability of conditionalsepistemic validitynegative validitypositive validityRamsey's conditionals
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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New surprises for the Ramsey test ⋮ From epistemic norms to logical rules: epistemic models for logical expressivists ⋮ AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS ⋮ AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change ⋮ An internal version of epistemic logic ⋮ FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTEXT AND CONTENT: INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY ⋮ BELIEF-REVISION, THE RAMSEY TEST, MONOTONICITY, AND THE SO-CALLED IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS ⋮ Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic ⋮ Indicative conditionals and graded information ⋮ Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systems
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