Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/S001820050100MaRDI QIDQ1293483zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Douglas D. Davis, Charles A. Holt

Publication date 14 June 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050100

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicssequential equilibriumPareto undominated punishment equilibriumrenegotiation proof equilibriatwo person, two-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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(6)

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• Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?
• Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes
• Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• Building rational cooperation

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