Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/S001820050100zbMATH Open0937.91032OpenAlexW1982199583MaRDI QIDQ1293483FDOQ1293483

Authors: Douglas D. Davis, Charles A. Holt 

Publication date: 14 June 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050100

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zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicssequential equilibriumPareto undominated punishment equilibriumrenegotiation proof equilibriatwo person, two-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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• Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

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