How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00189-0zbMATH Open0883.90048MaRDI QIDQ1363816FDOQ1363816

Authors: Liping Fang, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith William Hipel 

Publication date: 22 September 1997

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?
• Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation.
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• Enforcement and over-compliance
• Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations.

zbMATH Keywords

enforcementenvironmental lawsenvironmental policy development

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Inspection games in arms control
• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?

Cited In (2)

• Regulation games between government and competing companies: oil spills and other disasters
• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?

This page was built for publication: How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1363816)