How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00189-0MaRDI QIDQ1363816zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Liping Fang, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith William Hipel

Publication date 22 September 1997

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

enforcementenvironmental lawsenvironmental policy development

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?
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Cites work

• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?
• Inspection games in arms control

Cited in

(2)

• Regulation games between government and competing companies: oil spills and other disasters
• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?

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