Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market
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Publication:1375554
DOI10.1023/A:1007749008635zbMATH Open0900.90204OpenAlexW1603483330MaRDI QIDQ1375554FDOQ1375554
Authors: Frank Sloan, Edward C. Norton 
Publication date: 28 January 1998
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007749008635
Cited In (5)
- On the characteristics of reporting ADL limitations and formal LTC usage across Europe
- Flexible and Affordable Methods of Paying for Long-Term Care Insurance
- Restricting Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information
- Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
- Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard
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