Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market

DOI10.1023/A:1007749008635MaRDI QIDQ1375554zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frank Sloan, Edward C. Norton

Publication date 28 January 1998

Published in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007749008635

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cited in

(5)

• On the characteristics of reporting ADL limitations and formal LTC usage across Europe
• Flexible and Affordable Methods of Paying for Long-Term Care Insurance
• Restricting Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information
• Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
• Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard

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