Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
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Recommendations
- Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships
- An equilibrium analysis of the long-term care insurance market
- Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard
- Insurance with a deductible: a way out of the long term care insurance puzzle
- ``Honor thy father and thy mother or not: uncertain family aid and the design of social long term care insurance
Cites work
Cited in
(7)- Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships
- On the characteristics of reporting ADL limitations and formal LTC usage across Europe
- Old-age care prevalence in Switzerland: drivers and future development
- Long-term care insurance decisions
- An equilibrium analysis of the long-term care insurance market
- On the effects of public subsidies for severe and mild dependency on long-term care insurance
- Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard
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