Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2020.04.002MaRDI QIDQ784422zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Zweifel

Publication date 3 August 2020

Published in Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

long-term care insuranceinnovation in insurancejoint contractsrelational moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Recommendations

• Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
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• ``Honor thy father and thy mother or not: uncertain family aid and the design of social long term care insurance
• Work incentives and household insurance: sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
• Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships

Cites work

• Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market
• Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships
• Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use

Cited in

(3)

• Pricing of Joint Life Long-Term Care Insurance Based on a Multistate Markov Model
• Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
• On the effects of public subsidies for severe and mild dependency on long-term care insurance

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