Bilateral bargaining. Theory and applications

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-56160-3zbMATH Open0996.91003OpenAlexW4210732126MaRDI QIDQ1598528FDOQ1598528

Stefan Napel

Publication date: 23 May 2002

Published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56160-3

zbMATH Keywords

power indicessatisficingbilateral bargainingadaptive behaviourinferior player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cited In (6)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents
• Patience in repeated bargaining: revisiting Muthoo (1999)
• Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
• Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol
• Extending the alternating-offers protocol in the presence of competition: Models and theoretical analysis

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