Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1160MaRDI QIDQ1604641zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stephen Polasky, Okmyung Bin

Publication date 8 July 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1160

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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