Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1160zbMATH Open1050.91075OpenAlexW2040780817MaRDI QIDQ1604641FDOQ1604641

Authors: Stephen Polasky, Okmyung Bin 

Publication date: 8 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1160

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (2)

• Monopoly, potential competition and private stock information in exhaustible resource markets
• Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators

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