Cooperate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms
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Publication:1606366
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00145-7zbMATH Open1037.91571OpenAlexW2072165124MaRDI QIDQ1606366FDOQ1606366
Authors: Eric Lefebvre, Francis Bloch 
Publication date: 30 July 2002
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00145-7
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Cited In (15)
- Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition
- COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES
- The effects of trade liberalization on tax avoidance
- Search costs and corporate income tax competition
- Capital mobility and tax competition.
- Lifestyle taxes in the presence of profit shifting
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND AGGLOMERATION OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION WITH TRANSFER PRICING
- Multinational firms mitigate tax competition
- Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: how larger markets reduce profit taxes
- On the scope for international tax cooperation: The role of capital controls
- Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment
- Social comparisons in consumption, international capital flows and tax competition
- Asymmetric capital tax competition with profit shifting
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