Asymmetric capital tax competition with profit shifting
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Publication:814833
DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0131-0zbMATH Open1132.91574OpenAlexW2164760134MaRDI QIDQ814833FDOQ814833
Authors: Sven Stöwhase
Publication date: 7 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0131-0
Recommendations
- Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: how larger markets reduce profit taxes
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Cooperate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms
- Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition
- An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition
- Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?
- Capital mobility and tax competition.
- Lifestyle taxes in the presence of profit shifting
- Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND AGGLOMERATION OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION WITH TRANSFER PRICING
- Multinational firms mitigate tax competition
- Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: how larger markets reduce profit taxes
- Transfer Pricing, Double Taxation, and the Cost of Capital
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