Doubly invariant equilibria of linear discrete-time games

DOI10.1016/S0005-1098(02)00063-8zbMATH Open1029.91012MaRDI QIDQ1614423FDOQ1614423

Elena De Santis, Paolo Caravani

Publication date: 5 September 2002

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4070593

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcontrolled invariancediscrete-time dynamic gamesdoubly invariant equilibriumfault tolerance-macroeconomics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Dynamic games (91A25) Discrete-time games (91A50)

Cites Work

• Viability theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimization of the l/sup ∞/-induced norm under full state feedback
• A polytopic game
• Nonlinear state feedback for \(\ell^ 1\) optimal control
• Double invariance: A new equilibrium concept for two-person dynamic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (6)

• Invariant sets in the discrete game of retention
• Optimized robust control invariance for linear discrete-time systems: theoretical foundations
• A polytopic game
• Double invariance: A new equilibrium concept for two-person dynamic games
• Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games
• Discussion on: ``Global regulation of input-saturated discrete-time linear systems subject to persistent disturbances

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