Opaque selling in congested systems

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2016.09.005MaRDI QIDQ1709946zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xin Geng

Publication date 15 January 2019

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

congestionuniform pricingopaque selling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms
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Cites work

• The slow server problem
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.

Cited in

(6)

• Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms
• Opaque distribution channels for competing service providers: posted price vs. name-your-own-price mechanisms
• Opaque selling of multiple substitutable products with finite inventories
• Optimal allocation of an opaque product with consumer learning
• Suffocating Fire Sales
• Revenue management with strategic customers: last-minute selling and opaque selling

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