Local interactions and p-best response set

DOI10.1155/2014/415686MaRDI QIDQ1714596zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Jacques Durieu, Philippe Solal

Publication date 1 February 2019

Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/415686

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

Summary: We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite \(n\)-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal \(p\)-best response set to analyze distributions of actions on the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal \(p\)-best response set can be selected provided that \(p\) is sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule.

Recommendations

• A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem
• Local interaction on random graphs
• p-best response set
• Best response dynamics on random graphs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 549854
• Correlated equilibria and local interactions
• Local completeness and Pareto optimization
• Simple and local independent set approximation
• Simple and local independent set approximation

Cited in

(3)

• A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem
• Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
• p-best response set

This page was built for publication: Local interactions and \(p\)-best response set

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1714596)