Pricing policies for selling indivisible storable goods to strategic consumers
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Publication:1730708
DOI10.1007/S10479-018-2916-XzbMath1407.91120arXiv1509.07330OpenAlexW3099914771MaRDI QIDQ1730708
Gerardo Berbeglia, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
Publication date: 6 March 2019
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.07330
dynamic programmingmonopolyprice discriminationstorable goodsprice commitmentprice optimizationprofit bounds
Related Items (4)
Monopoly pricing in vertical markets with demand uncertainty ⋮ STORABLE GOOD MARKET WITH INTERTEMPORAL COST VARIATIONS ⋮ Optimal pricing strategy in a dual-channel supply chain: a two-period game analysis ⋮ Tight bounds on the relative performances of pricing optimization mechanisms in storable good markets
Cites Work
- Optimal dynamic procurement policies for a storable commodity with Lévy prices and convex holding costs
- Dynamic pricing of limited inventories for multi-generation products
- Commitment for storable good duopoly
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Lot sizing and scheduling -- survey and extensions
- Dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic: analysis of posted and contingent pricing schemes
- Contingent Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers
- Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior
- Strategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases
- Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Modeling industrial lot sizing problems: a review
- Pricing non-storable perishable goods by using a purchase restriction with an application to airline fare pricing
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