Logit selection promotes cooperation in voluntary public goods game
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Behavior-based cellular automaton model for pedestrian dynamics
- Cooperative behavior evolution of small groups on interconnected networks
- Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
- Evolution of cooperation on adaptively weighted networks
- Evolution of the social network of scientific collaborations
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
- The evolution of cooperation
Cited in
(9)- Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a public good game
- Promotion of cooperation based on swarm intelligence in spatial public goods games
- Preferential selection and expected payoff drive cooperation in spatial voluntary public goods game
- Memory-based stag hunt game on regular lattices
- Variable valuations and voluntarism under group selection: an evolutionary public goods game
- Evolution of cooperation in public goods games
- Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
- A further analysis of the role of heterogeneity in coevolutionary spatial games
- Impact of multi-step punishment on the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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