Threatening to buy: private equity buyouts and antitrust policy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.12.027zbMATH Open1397.91369OpenAlexW2777513162MaRDI QIDQ1787345FDOQ1787345

Authors Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson, Joacim Tåg

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/183428

zbMATH Keywords

antitrust policyprivate equityM\&Astemporary ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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