Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.04.011zbMATH Open1397.91215OpenAlexW2800855411WikidataQ129978100 ScholiaQ129978100MaRDI QIDQ1787614FDOQ1787614

Authors: Guillaume Cheikbossian, Romain Fayat 

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26023/1/wp_tse_918.pdf

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

complementaritygroup contestgroup size paradox(impure) public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Group contest success functions

Cited In (9)

• Group size and group success in conflicts
• Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
• Group size paradox and public goods
• A simple model of competition between teams
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• The weakness of strong ties: Collective action failure in a highly cohesive group*
• Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods
• Group size effects in social evolution
• The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups

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