Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.

DOI10.1007/S007120200041MaRDI QIDQ1865791zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joachim Rosenmüller, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s007120200041

zbMATH Keywords

cartelsglove gamemodiclusnucleolusShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The authors discuss market games or linear production games with a large finite set of agents. The representing distributions of initial assignments are assumed to be uniform distributions with disjoint carriers. Thus, the agents decompose into finitely many disjoint groups where each holds a corner of the market. The authors argue that the formation of cartels should be explained endogenously by following a paper of \textit{S. Hart} [J. Econ. Theory 7, 453-466 (1974)]. Accordingly, they present a solution concept of modified nucleolus (or modiclus) that not only predicts cartelization but also explains the profits of the long side by its preventive power.

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Cited in

(6)

• Cartels via the modiclus.
• The endogenous formation of cartels
• A note on weighted multi-glove games
• Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games
• Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)

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