A mathematical analysis of the long-run behavior of genetic algorithms for social modeling

DOI10.1007/s00500-012-0804-xzbMath1255.68148WikidataQ56475661 ScholiaQ56475661MaRDI QIDQ1933789

Ludo Waltman, Nees Jan van Eck

Publication date: 25 January 2013

Published in: Soft Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-012-0804-x

zbMATH Keywords

genetic algorithm; evolutionary game theory; economics; social modeling; long-run behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68T20: Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.)

91A22: Evolutionary games

Uses Software

• Genocop
• MCQueue

Cites Work

• Genetic learning as an explanation of stylized facts of foreign exchange markets
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• The Evolution of Cooperation
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The influence of evolutionary selection schemes on the iterated prisoner's dilemma
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