Practical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: two kinds of maximization

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9338-ZMaRDI QIDQ1936331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elias L. Khalil

Publication date 4 February 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z

zbMATH Keywords

AristotleKenneth HammondLeontief preferencesrational choice theorySimon-Gigerenzer programTversky-Kahneman program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• Microeconomic theory
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
• Warrant and Accidentally True Belief

Cited in

(1)

• How infallible but corrigible full belief is possible

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