Practical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: two kinds of maximization

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9338-ZzbMATH Open1282.91084OpenAlexW2001212785MaRDI QIDQ1936331FDOQ1936331

Elias L. Khalil

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z

zbMATH Keywords

AristotleKenneth HammondLeontief preferencesrational choice theorySimon-Gigerenzer programTversky-Kahneman program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• Warrant and Accidentally True Belief

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