Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00236-0zbMATH Open0945.91033WikidataQ127015929 ScholiaQ127015929MaRDI QIDQ1978524FDOQ1978524

Authors: R. Fahr, Bernd Irlenbusch 

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Do the reciprocal trust less?
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior
• The self-fulfilling property of trust: an experimental study
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence

zbMATH Keywords

trustfairnessreciprocityexperimentsproperty rightsreal effortmindreading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
• On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (5)

• A Yin and Yang perspective on the trust game: trust and reciprocity
• Trust with private and common property: effects of stronger property right entitlements
• Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
• The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games

This page was built for publication: Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1978524)