Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00236-0MaRDI QIDQ1978524zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors R. Fahr, Bernd Irlenbusch

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

trustfairnessreciprocityexperimentsproperty rightsreal effortmindreading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650245 (Why is no real title available?)
• More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
• On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history

Cited in

(5)

• A Yin and Yang perspective on the trust game: trust and reciprocity
• Trust with private and common property: effects of stronger property right entitlements
• Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
• The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games

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