An evolutionary game model of knowledge workers' counterproductive work behaviors based on preferences
Summary: Knowledge workers' Counterproductive Work Behaviors (CWB) always cause great loss to enterprises, but it is hard to supervise these behaviors. Based on the analysis of the causes of these behaviors, this paper builds a theoretical model of knowledge workers' CWB and proposes that knowledge workers' CWB are influenced by both rational and irrational factors. Regarding contextual factors and individual factors as risk preferences of knowledge workers, this paper establishes an asymmetrical evolutionary game model of enterprise supervision. Then, multiagent modeling simulation is conducted to discuss the effect of both formal and informal constraints on knowledge workers' CWB and, based on it, the intervention strategies of enterprises are proposed. The simulation results show that the effect of informal constraints is bigger than the effect of formal constraints. The working environment and knowledge workers' personality traits are the key factors to produce CWB.
- Altruistic punishment, status conflict, and knowledge sharing in the workplace: an evolutionary game model
- Evolutionary game analysis on safety production behavior supervision of enterprises based on prospect theory
- Behavior choice of game parties under the interference of cognition in the game between coal miners and supervisors
- Game theory of knowledge sharing in knowledge network of technology transferring team
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583198
This page was built for publication: An evolutionary game model of knowledge workers' counterproductive work behaviors based on preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2012781)
