Nash equilibria in location games on a network
DOI10.1007/S00291-017-0472-4zbMATH Open1375.90168OpenAlexW2582260681MaRDI QIDQ2014595FDOQ2014595
B. Pelegrin, Mercedes Pelegrín
Publication date: 25 August 2017
Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-017-0472-4
Recommendations
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mixed integer programming (90C11) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Location analysis: a synthesis and survey
- Static competitive facility location: an overview of optimisation approaches.
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- Location equilibria for a continuous competitive facility location problem under delivered pricing
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- Hotelling's duopoly on a tree
- Competitive location on networks under delivered pricing
- The Existence of Equilibria in the 3-Facility Hotelling Model in a Tree
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Isodistant points in competitive network facility location
- Market and Locational Equilibrium for Two Competitors
- Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game
- Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree
Cited In (13)
- Approximation of the competitive facility location problem with MIPs
- Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition
- Market and Locational Equilibrium for Two Competitors
- Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
- Sequential Location Game on Continuous Directional Star Networks
- Stability of Nash equilibria in locational games
- Nash Equilibria in Network Facility Location Under Delivered Prices
- A pure strategy nash equilibrium for a 3-firm location game on a sphere
- Competitive location on networks under delivered pricing
- Methods for computing Nash equilibria of a location-quantity game
- Two-player simultaneous location game: preferential rights and overbidding
- EVALUATING ALL BERTRAND-NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A DISCRETE SPATIAL DUOPOLY MODEL
- Competitive Location with Random Utilities
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